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Assignments of non-retail commercial leases – some 
contentious issues. 
Professor WD Duncan1 
Professor Sharon Christensen2 
Assignment clauses in non-retail commercial leases are as infinitely varied as the 
circumstances in which disputes arise. Each clause must be individually interpreted as part 
of the lease in which it is embedded. Whilst the assignment of a lease is one of the most 
commonplace transactions between lessor and lessee, the case law reveals few unifying 
principles. This article seeks to cautiously identify a set of principles which should be in the 
mind of any lawyer when a dispute relating to an assignment arises. It concludes with a short 
checklist of matters which must be considered by such a person to encourage the 
application of principles in the first instance towards a resolution of the dispute. 
1. Introduction 
The law regulating assignments of non-retail commercial leases varies throughout Australia. 
Most non-retail commercial leases include a covenant expressly permitting assignment of the 
lease upon certain terms. The assignment of a retail lease requires consideration of additional 
statutory provisions which are not the subject of this article.3 It would have been thought that 
such a prosaic and common place transaction as this might be free of contention. However, 
on a number of counts, the process regularly gives rise to litigation. There are two major 
areas where disputation is litigated. The first concerns the construction of the clause and the 
extent to which statutory intervention in some jurisdictions impinges upon construction. The 
second concerns what constitutes a reasonable refusal of consent and the difficulty for lessors 
of drawing out unifying principles from the case law. 
It is not uncommon for a covenant to permit qualified assignment with the consent of the 
lessor and further qualified by the proviso that such consent is not to be unreasonably 
withheld. Whilst this form of covenant may be the most often encountered in practice, in 
reality, assignment covenants take many forms as the plethora of case law upon the subject 
attests. The statutory regulation of this form of assignment covenant varies from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction within Australia, with the consequence that the outcomes of litigation upon 
what is a similar issue can vary considerably. This article considers the efficacy of the 
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statutory provision in the jurisdictions in which it applies and what might be done to make it 
more effective.  
In New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory4 in any lease requiring the 
consent of the lessor to an assignment, a provision is implied by statute that such consent 
must not be unreasonably withheld and in those jurisdictions this applies notwithstanding 
anything expressed in the lease. In Victoria and Western Australia,5 the same rule applies but 
in these jurisdictions its application is subject to a contrary provision in the lease. South 
Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory have no similar provision and the 
parties are free to restrict or allow assignment of a lease on any terms. Apart from this 
national anomaly, it has become very common to contract out of the section both in those 
States and Territories where the provision applies despite anything in the lease and where 
there is statutory authority to contract out. Contracting out in New South Wales , Queensland 
and the Northern Territory occurs by framing the assignment clause so that assignment is not 
subject to the consent of the lessor. If the clause is properly drafted the issue of whether 
consent is unreasonably withheld or not does not arise. One wonders, therefore, whether such 
a provision serves any practical purpose in its present form given its absence in some 
jurisdictions and the ability of a lessor in other jurisdictions to easily draft around its 
application even though the statute provides for it to apply notwithstanding anything in the 
lease. 
The second area of contention, which is much litigated, relates to how the courts variously 
perceive what constitutes an unreasonable refusal whether pursuant to a requirement in the 
lease or the application of the statutory provisions. Originally this inquiry constituted a sole 
concentration upon the character and experience of an incoming assignee of the lease but 
broadened at an early date to take account of a consideration of the lessor’s interests as well. 
It is in achieving a balance between these factors that litigation has arisen. Lord Denning MR 
understated the position when he observed in Bickel v Duke of Westminster6 in 1976 when 
considering whether a refusal of consent was unreasonable: 
“Seeing that the circumstances are infinitely various, it is impossible to formulate strict rules 
as to how a landlord should exercise his power of refusal. The utmost the courts can do is to 
give guidance to those who have to consider the problem. As one decision follows another, 
people will get to know the likely result in any set of circumstances. But no one decision will 
be a binding precedent as a strict rule of law.7” 
These words today, even in contemporary Australia, have proved prophetic. Before 
considering the concept of “unreasonable refusal” further, it is appropriate to consider the 
effect of statutory intervention into the assignment process in those jurisdictions8 where it is 
mandated. 
                                                            
4   Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW),s 133B(1)(a); Property Law Act 1974Qld),s 121(1)(a); Law of Property Act (NT),s134(1). 
5   Property Law Act 1958(Vic),s 144(1); Property Law Act 1969(WA),s 80. 
6   [1977] QB 517 (CA). 
7   Ibid 524. 
8   New South Wales, Queensland and Northern Territory. 
3 
 
2. Avoiding the application of the statute through drafting 
There are several methods which lessors have lawfully employed to circumvent the 
application of the statutory provisions and effectively eliminate the oversight of the court 
from a consideration as to whether consent to an assignment was reasonably withheld or not. 
In summary these methods are: 
1. Drafting the covenant as an absolute prohibition upon assignment, but permitting 
assignment upon the satisfaction of a number of stipulated criteria. These will usually 
relate directly to matters that a lessor might reasonably take into account when 
considering whether or not to assign to a prospective assignee.  
2.  Making the performance of certain obligations by the lessee a condition precedent to 
seeking consent to the assignment of the lease. A common example is a requirement 
for the lessee to offer to surrender the lease to the lessor. 
3.  Drafting the assignment covenant to require the consent of the lessor to assignment, 
but not in the case of a person whose qualities are described. For example, that 
consent will not be withheld in the case of a “respectable or responsible person” (or 
person with similar characteristics as the assignor. Other descriptors might include 
similar financial standing, has experience in a similar type of business, has a 
comparable reputation in the commercial field as the assignor, 
Where each of these drafting methods is employed, the question for a court where an 
assignment to a nominated assignee is refused, is not whether the refusal is unreasonable but 
whether all the conditions set out in the clause have been met. This restricts the amplitude of 
the enquiry by the court and the discretion the court may exercise compared to what it might 
have done had the statute applied. 
4. Requiring the lessor’s consent to the assignment of the lease, but specifying a list of 
guidelines relevant to whether consent should be granted.  
In this instance, the statutory qualification for consent not to be unreasonably refused is 
relevant, but the extent to which and manner in which the guidelines might influence that 
decision is contestable. 
There are other permutations and combinations of these four broad categories, for example, 
stating that consent may be refused in enumerated circumstances. The effect of such a 
declaration in the face of the statutory provision is unclear. Each of these drafting methods 
are analysed in detail. 
 
2.1 Express prohibition upon assignment but permitted subject to 
enumerated conditions 
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There is no legal objection to an absolute prohibition on assignment of a lease. However, as 
commercial leases are an important business asset, it is not practical for a lessor to restrict 
assignment absolutely as the assets and undertaking of a business must be saleable both to the 
owner and any secured creditor. For commercial reasons the lease of the property will need to 
be transferable subject to conditions which might reasonably be expected by a lessor. These 
conditions may include any one or more of the following conditions: 
(a) the proposed assignee having certain characteristics, for example, of similar or better 
financial standing as the assignor; 
(b) that the lessee pays the lessor’s legal fees incurred in the transaction; 
(c)  that there are no existing breaches of covenant; 
(d)  that the assignee, if a corporation, agrees to seek a guarantee of the obligations under 
the lease; and  
(e)  that the assignee agrees to execute a deed of covenant with the lessor in a form 
approved by the lessor; 
A well drafted clause purporting to take effect as a prohibition, except upon the satisfaction 
of certain enumerated conditions, should avoid the use of the word “consent”. Any reference 
to consent of the lessor will bring the statutory qualification into play making any refusal 
subject to the consent not being unreasonably withheld. In the absence of consent all that is 
required is for the lessee to fulfil the conditions creating the exception to the prohibition and 
the assignment will take effect. No question of consent arises.9 
If the expression “consent of the lessor” is mentioned in the clause, regardless of the 
construction of the clause as a prohibition upon assignment unless conditions are met, the 
consent will be construed as being qualified by the condition that it will not be unreasonably 
withheld. In other words, the court will determine whether the conditions have been satisfied 
and, if they have and the occasion for consent has arisen, the court will then examine whether 
consent has been unreasonably refused applying the usual tests.10 An assignment clause of 
this nature had to be construed in JB (Northbridge) Pty Ltd v Winners Circle Group Pty Ltd.11 
The initial paragraph of the assignment clause clearly prohibited assignment except subject to 
conditions, but included the consent of the lessor as a condition of assignment. There was no 
reference to the qualification of such consent not being unreasonably withheld. Despite the 
clear prohibition, Rein J held that the clause gave a qualified right to the lessee to assign and 
s133B(1)(a) of the Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW) was applicable to the assignment.12 To 
avoid this outcome, there must be no reference in the clause to requiring the consent of the 
lessor as a condition of assignment. 
2.2 Consent to assignment subject to the performance of a condition 
precedent  
                                                            
9   JDM Investments Pty Ltd v Todbern Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 349 at [36] per Hamilton J. 
10   Ibid Tamsco Ltd v Franklins Ltd (2001) 10 BPR 19,077 at [47] per Young CJ in Eq. 
11   [2014] NSWSC 950. 
12   Ibid [19]. 
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This type of assignment clause has similar characteristics to the first type of clause mentioned 
above. The most common form of this type of clause is where prior to making a request for 
assignment the lessee is required to offer to surrender the lease.  Clauses of this nature have 
been held both in England13 and Australia14 not to engage the statutory qualification. In such 
cases, the surrender might be accepted upon conditions permitting the lessor to effectively 
novate the lease and set other conditions if the prospective new lessee is to be accepted. 
Again, as no question of consent of the lessor arises, there can be no oversight by a court as 
to what might be unreasonable withholding of consent. Either the surrender is accepted or it 
is not. If it is not accepted, the lessee may freely assign without consent. 
2.3 Lease requires consent to an assignment must be sought from the 
lessor but that consent will not be withheld in the case of a 
“respectable or responsible person” 
Where an assignment clause requires the consent of the lessor to an assignment with the 
qualification that “such consent will not be withheld in the case of a respectable or 
responsible person” or such other descriptor, the covenant cannot be enlarged under the 
statute to “such consent will not be unreasonably withheld in the case of a respectable and 
responsible person”15 The question for any court upon a refusal by the lessor to consent to an 
assignment is whether the proposed assignee is a respectable and responsible person and, in 
that case, there is no room for the operation of the statutory qualification that “such consent is 
not to be unreasonably withheld”.16 The onus of proving that the proposed assignee was not 
in that nominated class would be upon the lessor.17 The net effect of this outcome is that 
where a proposed assignee is a respectable or responsible person, consent cannot be refused 
on some reasonable ground.18 This would seem very restrictive for any lessor. Even more 
damaging to a lessor is the possibility that if the covenant is read as an affirmative obligation 
upon the lessor to consent to the assignment to a nominated class of assignee, failure to do so 
will “probably” amount to a breach of covenant by the lessor sounding in damages, or if the 
term is essential, permitting termination by the lessee.19 
2.4 Clauses which provide for consent of the lessor but stipulate 
circumstances where it may be withheld 
Clauses of this nature are subject to the statutory qualification that consent may not be 
unreasonably withheld. If the refusal of consent to an assignment is refused by a lessor, and 
the lessee applies for a declaration that the consent has been unreasonably withheld, the court 
                                                            
13   Bocardo SA v S & M Hotels Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 17 (CA) approving Adler v Upper Grosvenor Street Investment Ltd [1957] 
1 WLR 227 
14   Creer v P & O Lines of Australia Pty Ltd (1971) 125 CLR 84   
15   Moat v Martin [1950] 1 KB 175 
16   Ibid 179 per Evershed MR (with whom Denning and Hodson LJJ agreed) 
17   Price v Perpetual Trustee (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 290 at 290‐291 
18   Woodfall,Landlord and Tenant, General Principles, 28th ed.,1978,[1‐1178]: cited with approval in dictum, Barina 
Properties Pty Ltd v Bernard Hastie Australia Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 480 at 492 per Reynolds JA 
19   Hodgins v Duke Nominees Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 74 at 86 per Williams J (FC) cf Ligon Sixty‐Three Pty Ltd v ClarkeKann 
[2015] QSC 153. 
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is free to consider the issue objectively on the merits. The parties to the lease cannot restrict 
the operation of the statutory qualification by deeming some circumstances to be either 
reasonable or unreasonable.20 Where the parties do specify an agreed number of 
circumstances or matters that may provide grounds for refusal, the court may treat them as 
guidelines relevant to the question of refusal or not of consent. The establishment of one of 
these factors may or may not lead to a declaration that consent has been unreasonably 
refused. The court is not bound by these declarations in the lease.21 
In JB( Northbridge)Pty Ltd v Winners Circle Group Pty Ltd,22 a lease contained a provision 
relating to assignment with the consent of the lessor. The lease also stipulated that the lessor 
would be entitled to withhold consent in certain enumerated circumstances. One of the 
questions for the court was whether these were the only circumstances in which the lessor 
could refuse consent. Rein J, in dictum, found that in all of the enumerated circumstances, it 
would be reasonable for the lessee to withhold consent and further that these would be the 
only reasons why consent might be refused.23 Given the diversity of assignment clauses 
prevalent in most commercial leases, it is surprising that this issue is not settled. The answer 
may lie in the fact that where the statutory qualification of reasonableness applies 
notwithstanding anything in the lease, the courts must rigidly apply an objective test whereas 
if the statute does not apply, the question is more one of construction of the clause. In that 
case the court must give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed and it may include 
matters that are deemed to be unreasonable by the parties. This means that material which 
would be extraneous to a court’s decision in the statutory jurisdictions (New South Wales, 
Queensland and Northern Territory), would be of greater account in other states. Although, as 
can been seen from the case law, courts are endeavouring more and more to give effect to the 
wishes of the parties in all instances. In the light of this, lessors are attempting more often to 
draft around the statute but, as recent cases illustrate, they are not always successful.  
3. Reasonableness of refusal 
A lessor may expressly prohibit the assignment of a lease.24 Conversely, a lease without any 
express covenant concerning assignment may be freely assigned without the lessor’s consent. 
At common law, where a lease provides for assignment expressly with the lessor’s consent 
which is unqualified, a lessor might withhold consent for any reason providing the lessor acts 
honestly in considering the question of whether to consent or not.25 This was thought to leave 
the lessor with too much power to refuse consent to an assignment for any reason. The 
statutory qualification upon the refusal of consent only had its origins in s 19(1) of the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 (Eng). The rationale for the enactment was that if the right of 
a lessor to refuse consent was open ended, without qualification, a refusal would have left the 
lessee in a precarious position, particularly if the assignment of the lease was a condition of 
the sale of a business conducted upon the leased premises. To assign without consent would 
                                                            
20   Creer v P&O Lines of Australia Pty Ltd (1971) 125 CLR 84at 91 per Windeyer J. 
21   Tamsco Ltd v Franklins Ltd (2001) 10 BPR 19,077 at [48] per Young CJ in Eq. 
22   [2014] NSWSC 950. 
23   [2004] NSWSC 950 at [21].  
24   Sweet & Maxwell Ltd v Universal News Services Ltd [1964] 2 QB 699 at 732 (CA). 
25   Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 570 at 589‐590 per Mason J. 
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expose the lease to forfeiture in the hands of the assignee, assuming an assignee would be 
willing to accept title to the lease in such circumstances.26 No implication of reasonableness 
could be made and, therefore, the lessor was not exposed to litigation for refusal upon any 
ground. Although a business contract may fall through due to the refusal of a lessor to 
consent to assignment of the lease, no remedy will lie against the lessor even though the 
lessor’s refusal may have caused the lessee loss as a result of losing a good sale.27 After a 
refusal, a lessor would then be free to bargain conditions, not related to the assignment, for 
ultimately giving consent to the assignment. This might be that the assignee pay increased 
rent, change use or concede some other benefit to the lessor beyond the terms of the lease.28 
By insisting upon the lessor’s refusal of consent to assignment being reasonable, courts have 
been able to objectively review the process and criteria for refusal in an individual instance, 
and particularly if the refusal gives effect to some ulterior commercial motive of the lessor. 
Examples of ulterior motives include forcing a surrender of the lease so as to enhance the 
investment value of the lessor’s property, 29 forcing the assignee to pay a higher rental30 or 
effectively add conditions to the lease in the hands of the assignee.31 Although theoretically 
the reason for refusal should be linked to the personality, experience or the ability of the 
lessee to perform the lease as it stands or the use of the demised premises,32 the courts now 
are prepared to take a wider view of the effect of the transaction and look at the consequences 
of a refusal to the lessee in view of the lessor’s stated reasons.33 It is the implied qualification 
in the statute “that such consent has not to be unreasonably withheld” that gives the court the 
right to consider the merits of the lessor’s decision including reasons objectively. It is not 
necessary for the lessors to prove that the conclusions which led them to refuse consent were 
justified, if they were conclusions which might be reached by a reasonable person in the 
circumstances.34 The onus of proof is upon the lessee to prove, upon the balance of 
probabilities, that the refusal is unreasonable not for the lessor to prove that it was 
reasonable.35 Where an assignment might be made to a person as described in the lease, 
without consent, such as a “respectable and responsible person”, if the lessor withholds 
consent in breach of this, the onus may be reversed in that the lessor will have to prove that 
the proposed assignee did not fit that description. If this is not successful, and the assignor 
suffers loss through a sale of the lease falling through, the lessor may be liable for damages 
for breach of a positive covenant to permit assignment to such a person.  
                                                            
26   Twidale v Bradley [1990] 2 Qd R 464 at 476 per CooperJ. 
27   FW Woolworth & Co Ltd [1937] Ch 37 at 53; Yared v Spier [1979] 2 NSWLR 291; Ligon Sixty‐Three Pty Ltd v ClarkeKann 
[2015] QSC 153. 
28   G Kodilinye ,”Refusal of consent to assign: the unreasonable landlord”(1988) Conv 45 at 45‐46. 
29   Bromley Park Garden Estates Ltd v Moss [1982] 2 All ER 890 at 898 per Cumming‐Bruce LJ (with whom Dunn and 
Slade LJJ agreed). 
30   JA Mc Beath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corporation Pty Ltd [1992]2 Qd R 121 at 133 per Kelly SPJ. 
31   Hamilton Island Enterprises v Boss [2010] 2 Qd R 115 at [147]‐[148] per Fraser JA. 
32   Houlder Bros & Co Ltd v Gibbs [1925] Ch 575 at ,583 ,587. 
33   Bickel v Duke of Westminster [1977] QB 517 at 524 per Denning MR: International Drilling Fluids Ltd v Louisville 
Investments Ltd [1986] Ch 513 at 519 per Balcombe LJ. 
34   Re Town Investments Pty Ltd’s Underlease[1954] Ch 301 at 315. 
35   Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Pty Ltd v St Martin’s Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596 at 611 per Mason 
J. 
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It was ultimately the view of the Law Commission in England36 in a review of the equivalent 
statutory provision that the imposition by statute of qualified covenants should not change. 
3.1 Reasonable refusal of consent 
A series of English decisions37 has made it clear that no one rule can be laid down for the 
application of the principles drawn from the decisions and each case should be considered on 
its own merits. Not only are there factual variables, but also variations in the manner in which 
the clause might be interpreted in a particular instance.38 However, this notwithstanding, the 
cases from both England and Australia are instructive. They fall generally into a series of 
particular circumstances upon which the issue has been argued, although, given the 
qualification above, even the series can lack coherence. 
a. Assignment adversely affecting the value of the reversion in the hands of the 
lessor 
Divergent views by the judges in the earliest reported English decisions did not augur well 
for the development of any principled approach to this question. Initial confusion arose 
because of the difference in approach between AL Smith LJ and Kay LJ in Bates v 
Donaldson.39 The assignment clause provided that consent was “not to be unreasonably 
withheld in the case of a respectable and responsible person”. The lessor had negotiated to 
buy out the lessee’s unexpired term of the lease, but failed to sign a contract with the lessee to 
do so. In the meantime, the lessee had successfully entered a contract with a proposed 
assignee to assign the lease for the same amount. The lessor refused consent to the 
assignment notwithstanding there was no other reason to refuse consent. The Court found that 
the refusal was unreasonable. Kay LJ indicated that it was not sufficient that the proposed 
assignee was a respectable or responsible person and that the lessor could still reasonably 
refuse consent.40 AL Smith LJ thought otherwise. His Lordship said to the effect that if the 
person proposed is not a respectable or responsible person, the lessor has an absolute right to 
refuse permission, but if they are respectable or responsible, the lessor cannot reasonably 
refuse consent on other grounds.41 The view of AL Smith LJ was preferred in Australia when 
the issue first arose.42 
The view of AL Smith LJ was also preferred in Re Gibbs and Houlder Brother Ltd’s Lease 43 
In that case, consent was held to have been unreasonably withheld where the clause said that 
it could not be withheld in the instance of a respectable and responsible person where the 
                                                            
36    Report on leasehold covenants restricting dispositions, alterations and change of use (1985) Law Com No 141, HC 
278, [4.31]. See also AJ Waite “The Law Commission report of leasehold covenants restricting dispositions, alterations 
and change of user” (1986) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 239 at 241.  
37   Collected in Ashworth Frazer Ltd v Gloucester City Council [2001] 1 WLR 2180 at 2182‐2183 per Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill (HL). 
38   Bickel v Duke of Westminster [1977] QB 517 at 524; Ashworth Fraser Ltd v Gloucester City Council [2001] 1 WLR 2180 
at 2182‐2183 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
39   [1896] 2 QB 241 (CA). 
40   Ibid 243. 
41   Ibid 247. 
42   Colvin v Bowen (1958) 75 WN(NSW) 262 at 266 per Walsh J. 
43   [1925] Ch 575 at 583 per Pollock MR;at 584 per Warrington LJ at 586‐587 per Sargant LJ. 
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proposed assignee already leased adjoining premises from the same lessor and their taking up 
of the assignment may have made the vacated premises difficult to re-let. The court found 
that the refusal of consent was unreasonable. The rationale for this finding was that the 
refusal had nothing to do with the personality or characteristics of the proposed assignee or 
the subject matter of the lease. The latter point referred particularly to the use to which the 
assignee wished to put the premises.44  
The refusal of consent in the above two instances was based upon reasons clearly extraneous 
to the character of the assignees and the subject matter of the lease and the lessor’s decisions 
were made solely to benefit the lessor’s interests.  
In Premier Confectionery (London) Co Ltd v London Commercial Sale Rooms Ltd,45 an 
assignment clause recited that the lessor’s consent to assignment was required, such consent 
not to be unreasonably withheld. The proposed assignee held the leases of two shops in one 
block owned by the lessor. The shop to be assigned was a tobacconists. The lessor objected 
upon the basis that the shop could not in the hands of a different person command the same 
rent. This would affect the overall value of the whole holding. In declaring that consent had 
not been unreasonably withheld in these circumstances, Bennett J considered the lessor’s 
interest ahead of those of the lessee and assignee as he held that the separate occupation of 
each shop (if the assignment were permitted) would have detrimentally affected the lessor’s 
interests as it could have the effect of setting up each lessee as competitors in the sale of 
tobacco products, which would not occur if the both tenancies remained in the possession of 
the same person. There also seemed to be an objection to the fact that the proposed assignee 
was a woman and the businesses carried on in the block were predominantly conducted by 
males.46 
In this decision, we see some consideration of the character of the proposed assignee and the 
subject matter of the lease (that is the unsuitability of a woman conducting a tobacconist’s 
business), but also the issue of depreciation in the value of the whole of the lessor’s property 
if the two tenancies were let to separate lessees. This decision was subsequently doubted in 
International Drilling Fluids Ltd v Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd47 upon the basis 
that should there be sufficient security for the rent and the use to which the assignee desired 
to put the premises was permitted by the lease, it will generally be unreasonable for a lessor 
to refuse consent to an assignment. However, that noted, the issue of whether the assignment 
in Premier Confectionery (London) Co Ltd v London Commercial Sale Rooms Ltd 48might 
have caused a depreciation in the value of the reversion was considered to be more relevant in 
the interest of the lessor that those commercial interests the lessor sought to protect in the 
earlier decisions. 
The prospective diminution in the value of the reversion or loss of the reversion caused by 
some characteristic of the proposed assignee has been a legitimate marker for refusing 
                                                            
44   Ibid at 585 per Warrington LJ. 
45   [1933] Ch 904. 
46   Ibid 910. 
47   [1986] Ch 513 at 523 per Balcombe LJ. 
48   [1933] Ch 904. 
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consent reasonably. Both in Norfolk Capital Group Ltd v Kitway Ltd49and Bickel v Duke of 
Westminster,50 the Court of Appeal found that consent to an assignment to particular 
assignees was reasonably withheld when the assignment would have enabled those assignees 
to take advantage of a statutory right to purchase the freehold. This would ultimately have led 
to both the depreciation in the value of the reversion as an investment, and ultimately, the 
destruction of the relationship of lessor and lessee.  
The other relevant issue is whether, particularly in the case of multi-tenanted properties, the 
assignment might lower the reputation of the reversion as a desirable place for prospective 
assignees to take a lease in the future.51 
b. Use to which assignee wishes to put the property 
The other area of contention is where the lessee is unable to use the property within the use 
covenant or indicates they intend to use the property in a manner clearly outside the use 
covenant. In such an instance, consent to the assignment can be refused as the lessor will not 
wish to invite future litigation between themselves and the assignee. However, it may not be 
reasonably refused where the use covenant is open to interpretation and where the lessee’s 
use of the premises “might or might not give rise to a breach of the lease”.52 
The problem with this form of objection is that it very much depends upon the breadth of the 
use expressed in the lease. A use clause which is very openly worded may give a lessor less 
opportunity to refuse consent than one which is narrowly construed. These matters could 
materially affect the value of the reversion and any reasonable lessor would be within their 
rights to protect the value of their property and refuse consent, particularly if the demised 
premises were outfitted for a specialist purpose. 
However, this objection does not often arise. If the lease is to pass with the sale of a business 
upon the demised premises, the incoming assignee will more than likely want to use the 
premises for the same use as the assignor. 
c. Where the personality of the assignee is unsuitable 
 Although this objection goes directly to the personal characteristics of the assignee and their 
ability to carry out the terms of the lease, the expression “personality of the lessee” 
comprehends just about every characteristic of a person relevant to being a lessee. An 
objection to an assignee may obviously be founded upon the grounds of financial standing or 
experience in the business to be conducted upon the leased premises or any aspect of the 
future conduct of the lease. It involves both objective and subjective judgments.53  
d. Ulterior motives of the lessee 
                                                            
49   [1977] QB 506. 
50   [1977] QB 517. 
51   Re Town Investments Ltd Underlease [1954] Ch 301at 304‐305 per Danckwerts J. 
52   Ashworth Fraser Ltd v Gloucester City Council [2001] 1 WLR 2180 at 2183 H per Lord Bingham of Cornhill; at 2202 EF 
per Lord Roger of Horseferry (HL) overruling Killick v Second Covent Garden Property Co Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 658. 
53   Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Limited v. St. Martin’s Investments Pty. Limited (1979) 144 C.L.R. 596, 609–610 
per Mason J. 
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It may also go to the motive of the assignee as well as the lessor in requesting an assignment 
For example, in Pimms Ltd v Tallow Chandlers in the City of London,54 the proposed 
assignees55 wished to take an assignment of a lease with a very short period to run so that 
they could take advantage of a redevelopment of the site which would have reduced the profit 
of the lessors in the redevelopment project. The Court found that this was effectively the only 
motive for the assignment and held that the lessor’s refusal was justified upon the 
unsatisfactory nature of the personality of the assignees.  
 
3.2 Unreasonable refusal of consent 
 
a. Lessor consents upon conditions which increase the assignee’s obligations under 
the lease 
It is clear that the assignee should take over the lease upon the same terms as it affected the 
assignor. The consent may to a limited extent be conditional, for example, subject to the 
assignee obtaining a guarantor or contracting a bank guarantee for the duration of their term 
as lessee. If reasonable, given the financial position of the proper assignee as compared with 
the assignor, this will not be seen to be effectively unreasonably withholding consent. This 
goes directly to the character and financial quality of the proposed assignee and their ability 
to perform the terms of the lease56. 
However, if the consent will only be given if the assignee signs up to more onerous 
obligations under the lease than was experienced by the assignor, the withholding of consent 
until the assignee agrees to this will be seen to be unreasonable as it changes the character of 
the lease.57 
b. If the lessor demonstrates an ulterior motive in refusing consent 
Where the lessor refuses consent to an assignment to force a surrender of the lease even if it 
is in the best interest of estate management as far as the lessor is concerned, the refusal of 
consent will be unreasonable.58 Forcing a surrender has been properly termed a collateral 
purpose, wholly unconnected with the lease and the character of the incoming assignee.59 A 
similar conclusion is reached about a refusal with a view to forcing a variation of rent beyond 
that contemplated by the lease to be paid by the assignee after the assignment.60 A demand 
for greater rent upon the occasion of an assignment without express warrant in the lease 
                                                            
54   [1964] 2 All ER 145 (CA). 
55   Ibid at 156 per Danckwerts LJ. 
56      Scarcella  v Linknarf  Management Services  Pty Ltd (in liq)(2005) NSW ConvR   56‐106,52,292 at [9] per Hamilton J  
57   Boss v Hamilton Island Enterprises Ltd [2010] 2 Qd R 115 at [145],[152] and [153] per Fraser JA. 
58   Re Winfrey and Chatterton’s Agreement [1921] 2 Ch 7at 10 per Sargant J (as he then was). 
59   Bromley Park Garden Estates Ltd v Moss [1982] 2 All ER 980 at 898 per Cumming‐Bruce LJ. 
60   JA Mc Beath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins [1992] 2 Qd R 121 at 132 per Kelly SPJ (with whom Ryan J agreed);WE 
Wagener Ltd v Photo Engravers Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 412 at 414 at 424 per Mc Mullin J. 
12 
 
would be treated as a fine or premium and would not be payable.61 The motive of the lessor 
also came into question in Eddadock Pty Ltd v Denning Properties Pty Ltd62 where a refusal 
of consent to the assignment was intended to force the proposed assignee, given their identity, 
to lease other premises in the building and thus found to be unreasonable. 
c.  Where the lessor insists upon a Deed of Covenant being signed by the assignee 
without authority in the lease to demand it.  
A deed of covenant of this nature creates privity of contract between the assignee and the 
lessor. It has been held in New Zealand that unless the lease contains an express term making 
this condition a part of the assignment process, the refusal of the lessor to consent to the 
assignment in its absence is unreasonable.63 Where this right of the lessor to a direct covenant 
with the assignee appears in the lease, it may be demanded reasonably as a condition of 
consenting to the assignment.64 
d.  Where the lessor defers consent by making unreasonable demands for 
information about the proposed assignee 
A lessor will be held to have unreasonably withheld consent where a decision is continually 
deferred until further information is provided upon which to base a commercial decision as to 
whether to consent to the assignment. An unreasonable deferral of consent may in extreme 
circumstances amount to a constructive refusal of consent.65 This was the case in Daventry 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Bacalakis Hotels Pty Ltd66 where the lessor refused to give consent until 
certain irrelevant information was furnished which was not necessary to make the decision. 
Thomas J summed up this situation well when he said: 
“[I]t is difficult to see how a landlord could be held to have unreasonably refused his consent 
until such time as he has sufficient details upon which to make a proper decision. This does 
not mean that a landlord may oppressively demand extensive particulars or insist upon the 
equivalent of answers to interrogatories. Nor does it mean that a tenant will fail unless he 
responds to each and every detail or issue raised by the landlord. What is required is fair 
dealing between the two parties to the end that the landlord may make a reasonable decision. 
The very situation demands that it be a quick commercial decision….There will be cases 
(such as the present) where the court has to discern the dividing line between genuine concern 
by a landlord to obtain relevant facts, and time wasting tactics, or the enquiries of an officious 
landlord looking for an advantage, or even simple oppression. The limits of relevant enquiry 
cannot be spelt out, but courts will be astute to recognise the difference between matters of 
central and peripheral relevance.67” 
                                                            
61   Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 132; Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), s 144(1); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 121(1)(b); 
Property Law Act 1969 (WA), s 80; Law of Property Act (NT), s 134(4). 
62   [2002] NSWSC 208. 
63   Corunna Bay Holdings Pty Ltd v Robert Gracie Dean Ltd [2002] 2 NZLR 186 at 192 (CA). 
64   Balfour v Kensington Garden Mansions Ltd (1932) 49 TLR 29. 
65       Lewis& Allenby (1909) Ltd v Pegge [1914] 1 Ch 782 
66       [1986] 1 Qd R 416 
67       Ibid at 412 
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4. Concluding observations 
The variety of assignment clauses in leases is infinite. The questions of whether a refusal to 
an assignment has been reasonable or not is still often litigated and is of great practical 
importance. Statutory regulation of an assignment of lease varies considerably throughout the 
seven Australian jurisdictions although the matters in issue if there is a dispute are very 
similar. What varies is the construction of an assignment clause and application of the 
statutory requirements. In recent times, in relation to retail leases, a disputed assignment is 
normally dealt with in the relevant retail leasing tribunal and it is only non-retail lease 
disputes which are adjudicated in superior courts. Consequently, the number of binding and 
persuasive judgments in this area is diminishing.  
It seems clear to the reader of judgments on this subject that some lessor’s solicitors have 
been successful in drafting around the statutory qualification whilst others have been 
unwittingly caught. Whilst the drafting of assignment clauses has become more complex, 
often unnecessarily so, the principles have not really changed over the years and the decisions 
upon the issues are really, in the first instance, questions of construction of an individual 
clause. The results of any dispute will depend upon certain factors: 
1. the construction of the clause attributed by the court; 
2. whether its interpretation is constrained by any statutory restriction; 
3. the extent to which the decision of any court is fettered by either 1 or 2 above; 
4. if unfettered, the extent to which a court will have regard to any provisions in the 
assignment clause which deem the refusal of consent to be reasonable; and  
5. the conduct of either party in the assignment process.68 
                                                            
68   A lessor’s refusal of consent may together with other conduct amount to unconscionable conduct. See  Sharon 
Christensen and WD Duncan, “Unconscionability in commercial leasing‐Distinguishing a hard bargain from unfair 
tactics”(2005) 13 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 158 at 169‐171 
